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ABSTRACT 
In a monetarily incentivized Dictator Game we expected Dictators’ empathy towards the Recipients 
to cause more pro-social allocations. Empathy was experimentally induced via a commonly used 
perspective taking task. Dictators (N = 476) were instructed to split an endowment of 10€ between 
themselves and an unknown Recipient. They could split the money 8/2 (8€ for Dictator, 2€ for 
Recipient) or 5/5 (5€ each). Although the empathy manipulation successfully increased Dictators’ 
feelings of empathy towards the Recipients, Dictators’ decisions on how to split the money were not 
affected. We had ample statistical power (above .99) to detect a typical social psychology effect 
(corresponding to r around .20). Other possible determinants of generosity in the Dictator Game 
should be investigated. 
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Experimentally Induced Empathy has no Impact on Generosity in a Monetarily Incentivized 
Dictator Game 
 
Behavior that benefits others at a personal cost to the behaving individual is a widespread 
phenomenon that continues to attract research attention in several fields, including philosophy, 
evolutionary biology, psychology, and economics. For example, humans invest time and energy in 
helping other members in their neighborhood (Van Vugt, Snyder, Tyler, & Biel, 2000), contribute 
to charity (Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002), come to each other’s rescue in crises and 
disasters (Loewenstein & Small, 2007), help strangers in spite of potential dangers (Clark, & Word, 
1974), and are even willing to give their lives for their nations (Stern, 1995). That human society is 
abundant with examples of such pro-social behaviors is sometimes considered particularly puzzling 
among economists, as it challenges the orthodox assumptions of self-interest inherent to many 
theoretically driven “rational choice” models of human behavior (Camerer, 2003). Nevertheless, a 
robust body of empirical evidence based on laboratory games – which recreate social interactions in 
the laboratory using real monetary payoffs – shows that human behavior deviates from economic 
predictions of profit maximization. The game that best shows this incongruity is the Dictator Game 
(DG; Eckel & Grossman, 1996; Hoffman, McCabe & Smith, 1996), currently the most prominent 
paradigm used by economists to investigate why human behavior sometimes deviates from pure 
self-interest (Bolton, Brandts, & Ockenfels, 1998; Camerer, 2003; Henrich et al. 2004; Engel, 
2011).  
The DG is a simple, two player game. Participants are assigned either of two roles: 
Dictator or Recipient. The Dictator is provided a fixed sum of money which she splits between 
herself and the Recipient.  Unlike many other games (e.g., the ultimatum game), the Recipient has 
no power to refuse the money – the game ends after the Dictator’s decision. Giving in the DG is 
both costly and unconstrained by fear of reprisal or other strategic considerations (Forsythe et al., 
1994; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986). Despite this, typical games result in Dictators donating 
approximately 20 to 30 % of the endowment (Camerer, 2003; Engel, 2011). 
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Whereas economists have primarily sought to explain pro-social behaviors with 
reference to the ultimate causes that could have made such behaviors evolutionarily adaptive, 
psychologists have typically focused on the proximate motives that drive individual organisms to 
engage in those behaviors in the moment (Scott-Phillips, Dickins, & West, 2011). That is, what is it 
that motivates people to devote their resources to helping others? The motivation for all intentional 
action, including all action intended to benefit others, was long assumed to be egoistic: people were 
assumed to benefit others because, ultimately, to do so would benefit themselves. The prevailing 
theories of egoism were challenged by the empathy–altruism hypothesis (Batson & Coke, 1981), 
according to which empathy, typically defined as “the ability to understand and share in another’s 
emotional state or context” (Cohen & Strayer, 1996, p. 988), promotes pro-social behavior in ways 
that cannot be accounted for by self-interest.  
The central assertion of the empathy–altruism hypothesis is that empathy evokes 
altruistic motivation with the ultimate goal of increasing another's welfare. Note that in contrast to 
the literature in economics, in which altruism typically refers to “costly acts that confer economic 
benefits on other individuals” (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003, p. 785), psychologists typically refer to 
altruism as the motivation to increase another person's welfare (Batson & Powell, 2003). The results 
from the stream of studies that followed the empathy-altruism hypothesis generally supported the 
view that empathy causes pro-social behavior. The dispute pertained primarily to whether this 
process was driven by heightened personal distress caused by the other’s suffering (psychological 
egoism) or by genuine concern for the other’s well-being (psychological altruism; see Batson & 
Shaw, 1991). 
The empathy-altruism hypothesis suggests that those with higher levels of empathy 
would be expected to act in a more responsive way to the perceived feelings of another (Andreoni, 
1990; Andreoni & Miller, 2002; Batson, 1991; Batson, Fultz, & Schoenrade, 1987; Eisenberg & 
Miller, 1987). We therefore expected that increasing Dictator’s empathy towards the Recipient by 
means of a widely used perspective-taking exercise (Ames, Jenkins, Banaji, & Mitchell, 2008; 
Batson, 1991, 2011; Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978; Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996; 
Stürmer, Snyder, & Omoto, 2005) would lead the Dictator to make more generous allocations in the 
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DG. Despite the obvious, almost trite, and basically commonsense nature of this hypothesis, we 
found no research that would directly test it. The closest we came was a study by Batson and Moran 
(1999), who found it remarkable that although more than 2000 prisoner's dilemma studies had been 
conducted by the early 1990s, none of them had “tested the relatively straight-forward derivation 
from the empathy-altruism hypothesis that inducing empathy for the other person in a one-trial 
prisoner's dilemma will increase cooperation” (p. 911; note that what they denoted co-operation, we 
would subsume under the more general concept of pro-social behavior). In fact, our hypothesis is 
even more straightforward than the one tested by Batson and Moran (1999). Although, defection in 
the prisoner’s dilemma is always rational from a self-interested perspective, the ideal outcome in a 
prisoner’s dilemma is mutual co-operation, providing more complex motives for pro-social 
behavior than the motives present in the DG (Camerer, 2003; Lönnqvist et al., 2013). Having 
argued that inducing empathy for the other person in a one-trial prisoner's dilemma should 
introduce a new prosocial motive – altruism – and that this motive should increase cooperation, 
Batson and Moran (1999) found support for this hypothesis. However, this influential study (cited 
around 300 times) has never been replicated. The small sample size (N = 60, i.e., ten participants in 
each cell of a 3 (High Empathy vs. Low Empathy vs. Control) x 2 (Business Frame vs. Exchange 
Frame)) design may raise concerns regarding the replicability of the findings (Open Science 
Collaboration, 2015). One consensus reached in the current discussion on the replicability of 
research results in social psychology is that sample sizes need to increase. 
Note that Batson and Moran (1999) sought to investigate whether empathy increases 
altruism. Although allocations in the DG have been described as altruistic (Benenson, Pascoe, & 
Radmore, 2007; Ben-Ner & Kramer, 2011; Israel, Weisel, Ebstein, & Bornstein, 2012), we reserve 
this term to denote the possible psychological motives underlying pro-social behavior. That is, we 
do not investigate whether empathy leads to altruistic motivation (cf. Batson & Moran, 1999), but 
whether empathy leads to more generous behavior in the DG, regardless of motives.  
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Methods 
Participants and Procedure 
Our study was conducted with 506 participants (mean age = 23.5 (SD = 4.03); 59% female) from 
the University of xxx (Germany) majoring in different disciplines. Participants were invited via a 
xxx mailing list with approximately 3700 subscribers who had signed up to take part in 
experiments. Sixteen experimental sessions were run with 30 to 32 participants per session. In each 
session, only two participants were chosen to be Recipients (32 Recipients in all) because we 
wanted to maximize the number of Dictators given our monetary constraints, leaving us with 476 
Dictators (no-one was excluded). Participants did not know that there were only two Recipients in 
each session. In each session, the two Recipients were randomly matched with two Dictators and 
paid accordingly. 
Upon arrival, participants were randomly (a) seated in computer cubicles that secured 
anonymity, (b) assigned a role (Dictator or Recipient), (c) paired into dyads, and (d) provided with 
written instructions. All experimental sessions were conducted on the computer using the 
experimental platform z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The experiment lasted for about an hour 
(participants completed a questionnaire after the DG). Subsequently, participants were compensated 
with a fixed amount of 4€ along with the amount that they earned in the DG. 
In the Empathy condition (N = 240), Dictators were asked, before making their 
decision, to write three sentences on a sheet of paper handed out to them about how they imagined 
the Recipient’s feelings and how their decision would affect the Recipient. They were given five 
minutes to complete this widely used empathy inducing task (Coke et al., 1978; Fultz, et al., 1986; 
Batson et al., 1988). In the control condition (N = 236), participants were asked to write three 
sentences about yesterday’s weather.  
Measures 
At the outset of the DG, the Dictator was provided with an amount of 10€ that was to be distributed 
between herself and the Recipient. The Dictator could choose the option “8/2” that yielded 8€ for 
herself and 2€ for the other person or she could choose the option “5/5” that yielded equal payoffs 
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of 5€ for both. The Recipient did not make any decision and the game was played only once. We 
chose the distribution 8/2 as our selfish option because the mean transfer in DGs is approximately 
20 to 30 % of the endowment (Camerer, 2003; Engel, 2011), suggesting that such a division is one 
that many participants would feel comfortable with (although continuous DGs have become 
increasingly popular, the game was originally dichotomous (Kahneman et al., 1986) and we wanted 
to keep it that way for reasons explained below). 
As a manipulation check, participants rated on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 6 (very 
much) to what extent they felt empathetic, sympathetic, affectionate, warm, compassionate, caring, 
and concerned in relation to the Recipient. The mean of the seven items was 2.062 (SD = 4.70) and 
Cronbach’s alpha was .93.  
After the manipulation check, participants completed a short questionnaire that 
contained a measure of personal values and a standard set of demographic variables including sex 
and age. No other measures were administered. However, as we, at the outset, were interested also 
in the possible associations between empathy and hypocrisy, the option to flip a coin in order to 
determine the outcome was included as a parallel experimental manipulation that we report on only 
briefly. I.e., half of the participants received a coin that they could flip in order to decide between 
the 5/5 and 8/2 outcomes. The coin was placed on the desk of the cubicle in which the Dictators 
made their decision and the accompanying instructions told Dictators that they could use the coin to 
determine their decision (it was this aspect of the research design that required us to employ a 
dichotomous dictator decision). Whether or not the participants were provided with the coin did not 
affect their decisions (F < 1 for both the main effect and for the interaction between providing a 
coin and the empathy manipulation). The results were also absolutely identical when those not 
provided with a coin were excluded from analyses. 
Results 
The manipulation check showed that the manipulation of empathy was effective. Those primed with 
empathy scored 2.565 (95% CI: 2.390-2.740) on feelings of empathy towards the Recipient, 
whereas those in the control condition scored 1.546 (95% CI: 1.368-1.723; F (1, 473) = 64.717, η2= 
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.121 (corresponding to an effect size of r = .35), p < .001). All analyses were run with sex, age, and 
their interactions with other variables as covariates (including the above mentioned parallel 
manipulation with/without coin), but as the results were always virtually identical, only analyses 
without covariates are presented. 
Among those 240 Dictators who received the empathy prime, 151 chose the 8/2 and 
89 chose the 5/5 distribution. Among the 234 Dictators in the control condition, 162 chose the 8/2 
and 72 the 5/5 distribution. A Chi-square test of independence was calculated comparing the 
frequency of the 5/5 choice among those primed with empathy and those in the control group. The 
difference between the two conditions (empathy vs. control) was not statistically significant (χ2(1) = 
2.106, ω = 0.067 (95% CI: -0.024 - 0.154), p = .147). The effects size ω = 0.067 corresponds 
directly to an effect size of r = 0.067. Sensitivity analyses showed that we would have had an above 
99% chance of detecting a typical social psychology effect size (r = .20; Richard, Bond Jr., & 
Stokes-Zoota, 2003; Stanley, Carter, & Doucouliagos, 2018). 
Discussion 
The current experiment tested the hypothesis that increasing Dictator’s empathy towards the 
Recipient would lead the Dictator to make more generous allocations in the DG. This hypothesis 
was refuted by the empirical evidence. We were thus, with an eight-fold number of participants and 
a more straightforward experimental setup – the DG is motivationally less complex than the 
prisoner’s dilemma – unable to reproduce the positive significant effect of empathy on pro-social 
behavior reported on by Batson and Moran (1999). Importantly, the experimental manipulation of 
empathy was successful: Dictators instructed to imagine the Recipient’s feelings felt more empathy 
towards the Recipient. There were also no ceiling or roof effects that could have distorted the 
results – in all, 161 of our 476 Dictators (34%) chose the equal allocation.  
Although there is no one-to-one correspondence between prosocial behavior and 
altruism and we did not set out to investigate whether empathy leads to altruistic motivation, our 
results do speak to the empathy-altruism hypothesis. Because empathy did not increase pro-social 
behavior, it seems reasonable to conclude that it did not cause altruistic motivation, or at least not 
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strong altruistic motivation. This can be considered surprising, taking into account that the 
empathy-altruism hypothesis has been supported by a large number of social psychology studies. 
One important advantage of investigating pro-social behavior in a monetarily incentivized DG is 
that it requires individuals to put their money where their mouth is. This is typically not the case in 
social psychology experiments. It seems possible that the altruistic motivation caused by empathy is 
so weak that even moderate monetary incentives (recall that our Dictators chose between an 8/2 and 
5/5 allocation of 10€) will override it. In case the stakes had been smaller (or hypothetical), 
Dictators could have been more inclined to act upon their feelings of empathy. Empathy has indeed 
been suggested to increase only superficial minimal-cost helping (Neuberg, Cialdini, Brown, Luce, 
Sagarin, & Lewis, 1997). Consistent with this line of thought, the study by Batson and Moran 
(1999) that found a positive effect for empathy required participants to allocate lottery tickets, and 
the mean expected pay-off was only $0.50. Employing at least moderate monetary incentives in 
future studies on the effects of empathy on pros-social behavior and altruistic motivation could be 
highly revealing. 
Some explanations of DG behavior allude to morality. People generally wish to 
consider themselves moral (Aquino & Reed, 2002), and judgments about right and wrong could 
thus guide Dictators’ behavior. Some researchers within moral psychology have viewed empathy as 
a source of principled moral judgment (Haidt, 2003; Nussbaum, 1996, 2001), whereas others have 
contended that empathy is not a good guide to moral judgments (Batson, 2011; Bloom, 2017). If an 
equal allocation (5/5) is judged more moral than an unfair allocation (8/2), our results suggest that 
feeling empathy towards someone does not always lead to more moral behavior towards that 
person. 
Our results could be sensitive to population differences. E.g., non-student populations, 
could be more affected by empathy (students of at least some disciplines, such as philosophy, may 
be less affected by feelings when making moral judgments; Haidt, 2001). Nevertheless, we caution 
that moderator effects are best detected when the relation between the predictor and outcome is 
substantial (Chaplin, 1991). The present results show that empathy is even at best not a strong 
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predictor of DG giving, implying that statistical tests of interaction effects would require extremely 
large samples. 
Sample size is more generally an issue within research on the DG. This journal, for 
instance, has published several articles on the determinants of pro-social behavior in the DG. The 
most highly cited of these studies have identified guilt (Gummerum, Hanoch, Keller, Parsons, & 
Hummel, 2010), social distance (Rigdon, Ishii, Watabe, & Kitayama, 2009), moral costs (Brañas-
Garza, 2007), and affect (Schulz, Fischbacher, Thöni, & Utikal, 2014) as determinants of pro-social 
behavior in the DG. The sample sizes of these studies vary from just over 50 to just under 140. The 
small sample sizes have most likely resulted in many of these (and other) studies on DG behavior 
being underpowered. Feelings of empathy, although not a determinant of DG giving according to 
our results, could be expected to be strongly associated with many of the above suggested 
determinants of DG behavior. This raises the question of replicability of previous findings and 
suggests the need to further explore the determinants of DG behavior.   
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